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Robert Brauchert
Professor Corbin was a special advisor for the original Restatement
of Contracts and a reporter for part of it. As a consultant for the second
Restatement he produced a critical review of the original which has
been the basis for much of the work on the revision. It seems appro-
priate, therefore, to offer a progress report on the second Restatement,
as I did in another issue of the Journal dedicated to Professor Corbin.'
The revision is hardly complete, but enough of it has been written
and reviewed by the Institute2 to justify confidence that much of the
reporting of contract law in the second Restatement will continue along
the lines of the changes completed thus far. The principal revisions
have continued to be stylistic rather than substantive,8 but the stylistic
changes reflect fundamental shifts in the modes of thought which domi-
nated the drafting of the original Restatement; increased attention has
been given to the purpose and function of the stated rules, to statutory
developments and their effect on judicial decisions, and to providing
qualifications required in a context of accelerating social change for
what would otherwise seem to be immutable rules. The Restatement,
however, retains the humility appropriate to an unofficial product of
private scholarship and has not assumed the role of seeking to reform
well settled but unjust rules.4
Perhaps the most noticeable shift thus far is the increased respect
accorded to freedom of contract-to the power of the contracting
parties to control the rights and duties they create. This shift appears in
black letter through the use of qualifying phrases such as "unless other-
wise agreed" or "unless a contrary intention is manifested." The shift
is made even more apparent in the expanded comments, which explain
the bases of the black letter rules and give notice of statutory and deci-
sional variations.
t Professor of Law, Harvard University; Reporter, Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
1. Braucher, Offer and Acceptance in the Second Restatement, 74 YALE L.J. 802 (1961).
2. RESTATEIMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAMS (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965) (tentatively ap-
proved in 1965) [hereinafter cited as REsr. 2D]; id. (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1967) (tcntatively
approved through § 164 in 1967); id. (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1968) (not reached at the 1968
annual meeting of the American Law Institute).
3. 41 ALI PROCrEDINGS 527 (1964).
4. E.g., REsr. 2D, § 48, comment a (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964) (termination of offer by
death); id. § 112, comment b (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965) (presumption of joint obligation).
5. E.g., REsr. 2D § 98 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
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This shift should not be exaggerated. The early chapters of the
Restatement which are discussed here and in my previous article" deal
with the basic power of contracting parties to create rights and duties
by making promises. Invalidating causes are largely left to later
chapters which have yet to be either revised or reported on. In addition,
the Statute of Frauds chapter elaborates on the statutory restrictions,
now nearly three centuries old, which limit the enforcement of un-
written promises. Other restrictions on freedom of contract are referred
to in the comments.7 To some extent, in fact, the changes in the Re-
statement are in the direction of being more candid in stating the
limitations on freedom of contract.
Thus, it is clear that the reporter and the advisors realize that
"freedom of contract" is not the ringing phrase it once was.8 The revi-
sion makes dearer the tension that exists between the doctrines of
freedom of contract and elemental fairness of the transaction; the bases
for enforcement set forth in Section 90 (detrimental reliance), Section
89A (promise for benefit received), and Section 89B (firm offer), em-
phasize the discretion that courts have to assure that injustice is pre-
vented. But the fact remains that freedom of contract is explicit as a
major feature of the second Restatement: "The governing principle in
the typical case is that bargains are enforceable unless some other prin-
ciple conflicts."9 Much of the rest is rationalization of the basic principle
and commentary.
My previous article in the Journal discussed the changes in the Re-
statement regarding offer and acceptance: 10 the discussion there em-
phasized the notion of voluntary agreement,1 which has been clarified
in the revision. Here, in discussing the changes that have been made in
the rules and comments concerning consideration and situations in-
volving more than two parties, I shall continue my commentary on the




"Bargain" is defined in terms of "an agreement to exchange."' ' With
stated exceptions, "the formation of a contract requires a bargain in
6. Braucher, supra note 1.
7. See, e.g., REsr. 2D, Introductory Note & § 5A, comments b, c (Tent. Draft No. 1.
1964).
8. See H. HAVIGHUaST, THE NATURE OF PR-vATz CONTRAcr 95 (1961).
9. RErS. 2D § 19, comment b (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964).
10. Braucher, supra note 1.
11. Id. 307.
12. Rsr. 2D § 4 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965). 599
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which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and a
consideration."' 3 To constitute "consideration," performance or a
return promise must be "bargained for," that is, "sought by the
promisor in exchange for his promise and.., given by the promisee in
exchange for that promise.' 4 Except for certain instances noted in the
Restatement "any performance which is bargained for is considera-
tion,"' 5 and "a promise which is bargained for is consideration if, but
only if, the promised performance would be consideration."''
These basic provisions on consideration are in substance the same as
those in the original Restatement: the changes are mainly stylistic and
terminological. In the original Restatement "consideration" referred
simply to the element of bargain or exchange; consideration which
satisfied the legal requirement was called "sufficient consideration."
Generations of law students and others found it confusing that the law
required a "sufficient" consideration yet did not sanction an inquiry
into the "adequacy" or relative value of the consideration." This con-
fusion is avoided in the second Restatement by using "consideration"
to refer to what the original Restatement called "sufficient considera-
tion." In accordance with common usage, both before and since the
original Restatement,8 failure to meet the consideration requirement
is then called "want" or "lack" or "absence" of consideration, rather
than "insufficiency" of consideration. A second change, also in the
interest of clarity, is made in the definition of "consideration" by spell-
ing out the "relation of reciprocal conventional inducement . . . be-
tween consideration and promise": 19 the original Restatement had
referred to acts "bargained for and given in exchange for the promise. '" °2 0
This provision was undoubtedly intended to mean "bargained for [by
the promisor in exchange for his promise] and given [by the promisee]
in exchange for the promise"; but the elliptical form of statement pro-
duced confusion or misunderstanding, and the notion is cast in a more
precise form in the second Restatement.2'
The rationalization of these basic provisions in the comments emplia-
13. Id. § 19.
14. Id. § 75.
15. Id. § 76.
16. Id. § 77.
17. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 81 (1932).
18. See, e.g., UNIFORM CONMERCIAL CODE § 3-306(c)[hereinafter cited as UCC; N.Y.
GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW § 5-1103 (McKinney 1964); N.Y. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW§ 54 (McKinney 1943).
19. See 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 293-94 (1881).
20. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 75 (1932).
21. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
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sizes party autonomy: "Bargains are widely believed to be beneficial to
the community in the provision of opportunities for freedom of indi-
vidual action and exercise of judgment and as a means by which pro-
ductive energy and product are apportioned in the economy. The
enforcement of bargains rests in part on the common belief that enforce-
ment enhances that utility."2' This emphasis is repeated in the text
and comment dealing with "adequacy of consideration": text-"there
is no additional requirement of . . . equivalence in the values ex-
changed.. .";o comment-
To the extent that the apportionment of productive energy and
product in the economy is left to private action, the parties to
transactions are free to fix their own valuations. ... [I]n many
situations there is no reliable external standard of value, or the
general standard is inappropriate to the precise circumstances of
the parties. Valuation is left to private action in part because the
parties are thought to be better able than others to evaluate the
circumstances of particular transactions. In any event, they are
not ordinarily bound to follow the valuations of others. -2 4
These affirmations of party autonomy are accompanied by recogni-
tion that the enforcement of some bargains may rest on substantive
grounds of reliance and unjust enrichment. And many bargains involve
natural formalities, such as acts in furtherance of performance, which
fulfill one or more of the functions served by legal formalities: evi-
dentiary, cautionary, channeling, and deterrent.2 Still, "the bargain
element alone satisfies the requirement of consideration,"20- and "for-
mality is not essential to consideration."27 In the case of the wholly
executory exchange of promise for promise, there may be no reliance or
unjust enrichment. Here
[t]he promise is enforced by virtue of the fact of bargain, without
more. Since the principle that bargains are binding is widely under-
stood and is reinforced in many situations by custom and conven-
tion, the fact of bargain also tends to satisfy the cautionary and
channeling functions of form. ... Evidentiary safeguards, however,
are largely left to the Statute of Frauds rather than to the require-
ment of consideration. -2 8
22. RFsr. 2 § 76, comment b (rent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
23. Id. § 81.
24. Id. § 81, comment c.
25. Id. § 76, comment c, see Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLU%. L. RE%,. 799
(1941); Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLU.t. L. RE%,. 929 (1958); Yon
Meihren, Civil-Law Analogues to Consideration, 72 IRv. L REv. 1009 (1959).
26. REsr. 2D § 76, comment b (rent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
27. Id. § 76, comment c.
28. Id. § 77, comment a.
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The quoted passages expand upon what was stated in the original
Restatement and do not contradict it. They lead naturally, however, to
a more rigorous adherence to the bargain concept: "a mere pretense of
bargain does not suffice, as where there is a false recital of consideration
or where the purported consideration is merely nominal. In such cases
there is no consideration and the promise is enforced, if at all, as a
promise binding without consideration under §§ 85-94."29 The original
Restatement indicated that a formal pretense of bargain by the payment
or promise of a nominal sum of money was sufficient for enforcement,
and former Section 76(c) made an exception for promises to exchange
unequal sums at the same time and place; in the new formulation of
consideration the exception becomes unnecessary. 30
B. Bargains Without Consideration
The law could be restated more simply, and possibly with greater
candor, if it were possible to say that there is consideration whenever
there is bargain. But it seems clear that promisors often bargain for the
performance of a legal duty by the promisee or for the making of an
illusory return promise. When such promises are held not binding, the
result could, in some cases, rest on an invalidating cause like mistake,
duress, or unconscionable conduct. But in judicial and academic usage
the promise is regularly said to be without consideration. In deference
to that usage the second Restatement, like the first, states the legal duty
and illusory promise rules3' as exceptions to the rule that anything
bargained for satisfies the requirement of consideration. This treatment
renders unnecessary any inquiry into the existence of . . an in-
validating cause [such as fraud, mistake, duress, undue influence, or
illegality], and denies enforcement to some promises which would
otherwise be valid . . . . [T]he likelihood that the promise was
obtained by an express or implied threat to withhold performance
of a legal duty. .. [negates] the presumptive social utility normally
found in a bargain. 82
The phrasing of the consideration rules regarding performance of a
legal duty and forbearance to assert invalid claims 3 occasioned a good
29. Id. § 75, comment b, especially illustration 8; cf. § 81, comment d. Contra, RE.
STATrMENT OF CONTRACTS § 84, illustration 1 (1932); see Note, 1 VALPARAISo U. L. Rv.
102 (1966).
80. See Whittier, The Restatement of Contracts and Consideration, 18 CALIF. L. REv.
611, 623 (1950).
31. REsT. 2D §§ 76A, 79 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
32. Id. § 76A, comment a.
33. Id. §§ 76A, 76B.
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deal of difficulty in the second Restatement. References to the law of
torts and crimes and to duties owed to the public, found in the original
Restatement,3 4 were deleted without important change of substance,
since the generalized black letter statement still covers such situations.
The black letter now states that performance of a legal duty "owed to
the promisor" is not consideration; if the legal duty is not owed to the
promisor, there is consideration, but illegality or other invalidating
cause may exist which would invalidate the bargain. The statement in
the original Restatement that performance which "differs in any way"
from that owed may be consideration is rephrased to require a differ-
ence "in a way which reflects more than a pretense of bargain;" 35 ac-
cording to a warning in the comment, that part of the rule which
provides that performance of a contractual duty may not constitute
consideration for a new promise has been much criticized and is com-
monly held to be displaced when slight variations in circumstance are
found.36 Finally, the performance of a legal duty amounted to con-
sideration in the original Restatement if the existence of the duty was
"the subject of honest and reasonable dispute,"3 7 and there was con-
sideration in the surrender of an invalid claim "by one who [has] an
honest and reasonable belief in its possible validity."38 These excep-
tions to the legal duty rule are now extended, in accordance with a great
deal of authority, to any situation where an "honest dispute" exists 9 or
where the "surrendering party believed that his claim or defense might
fairly be determined to be valid."40
With respect to illusory promises4' and voidable and unenforceable
promises,- the original Restatement took the position more rigorously
than some judicial decisions that the law does not inquire into the
adequacy of consideration. The second Restatement carries fonvard
the rigor, adds a denial that there is any requirement of "mutuality of
obligation" if the requirement of consideration is met, and seeks to
rationalize and simplify the black letter statement. In the process twvo
rather intricate changes of minor substance are made,4 3 both of which
34. R STATEMAiENT OF CoNTRA rs §§ 76, 84 (1932).
35. RFsr. 2D § 76A (rent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
36. Id. § 76A, comment c.
37. RESTATEMNT OF CONTRA=Ts § 76(a) (1932).
38. Id. § 76(b).
39. REST. 2D § 76A (rent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
40. Id. § 76B(1)(b), as revised to reflect discussion at the 1965 Annual Meeting. see
Whittier, The Restatement of Contracts and Consideration, 18 CALtF. . RE%. 611, 618-23(1930).
41. RST. 2D §§ 78, 79 (rent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
42. Id. § 80; RSrATFN OF CoNrmAcrs § 84 (1932).
43. REsr. 21) § 77, illustration 4, § 79, illustration 11 (rent. Draft No. 2, 1965) (con.
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require the enforcement of promises that were considered not binding
in the original Restatement.
C. Contracts Without Consideration
The second Restatement adheres to the decision made in the first: if
consideration is used only in connection with bargains it is necessary to
state that some promises are binding without consideration. These
kinds of promises are set forth in the provisions regarding waiver of the
statute of limitations, 44 discharge in bankruptcy,4 a technical condi-
tion,46 the right of avoidance 47 and stipulations.4 These provisions are
rephrased but not materially changed in substance. The comments,
however, are expanded and attention is called to various considerations
which support enforcing promises without consideration-their his-
torical background, reliance, unjust enrichment, and formality. Four
new sections are added,40 each of which specifies a new category of
binding promise. The famous Section 90 on reliance is somewhat
broadened. Like the original, the second Restatement indicates that
there may be additional categories of promises which are binding with-
out consideration. 0
Section 89A states a principle entirely new to the Restatement,
though not to judicial decision or law school instruction.
§ 89A. Promise to Pay for Benefit Received.
(1) A promise made in recognition of a benefit previously
received by the promisor from the promisee is binding to the
extent necessary to prevent injustice.
(2) A promise is not binding under Subsection (1)
(a) if the promisee conferred the benefit as a gift or for other
reasons the promisor has not been unjustly enriched; or
(b) to the extent that its value is disproportionate to the
benefit.
Like Section 90, this section probably has more theoretical interest than
practical significance. The comment explains that judicial opinions and
statutes have sometimes relied on "past consideration" or "moral obli-
gation" as a ground for enforcing a promise. Such decisions can be
trary to RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 80, illustration 4, § 84, Illustration 12 (1932), re-
spectively).
44. REST. 2D § 86 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
45. Id. § 87.
46. Id. § 88.
47. Id. § 89.
48. Id. § 94.
49. Id. §§ 89A-89D.
50. Id., Introductory Note to ch. 4, topic 2, at 84.
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treated as representing a minority view and as rejecting the orthodox
view that this ground is insufficient. The new section seeks to draw a
distinction between the cases involving moral obligations based on grat-
itude or sentiment and those cases which are on the borderline of quasi-
contract or unjust enrichment, where the subsequent promise removes
an objection which might otherwise bar quasi-contractual relief. In the
latter situation, the second Restatement permits enforcement of the
promise, making it unnecessary in some cases to decide a difficult ques-
tion as to the limits on quasi-contractual relief. The new section states
a principle rather than a rule and fairly bristles with unspecific concepts.
Moreover, the illustrations are miscellaneous and diverse, including
promises to correct mistakes, promises to pay for emergency services or
necessaries, and promises to pay expenses incurred in contemplation of
a bargain which fails. Yet it is the reporter's belief that this statement
of principle is more useful than the statutory formulation drafted by
the New York Law Revision Commission.
A promise in writing and signed by the promisor or by his agent
shall not be denied effect as a valid contractual obligation on the
ground that consideration for the promise is past or executed, if
the consideration is expressed in the writing and is proved to have
been given or performed and would be a valid consideration but
for the time when it was given or performed.51
This provision is too broad in scope and too restrictive in formal
requirements; it does not seem to have had any significant effect.
New Sections 89B-89D all deal with promises ancillary to bargains:
option contracts,52 guaranties,53 and modifications of executory con-
tracts. 54 The comments note that each of the three types of promise
possesses some of the presumptive utility of a bargain. Each of the three
sections contains a reference to statutory validation without considera-
tion55 and to a provision applying the general principle of Section 90
to reliance on the particular type of promise. In addition, Sections 89B
and 89C provide for nominal consideration, and Section 89D provides
for a modification which is "fair and equitable in view of circumstances
not anticipated when the contract was made."
51. NmW YoRK GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW § 5-1105, (McKinney 1964) (enacted in
1941); see REP. N.Y. LAIW REvISION Com. 345,395-96 (1941); Braucher, The Commission
and the Law of Contracts, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 696, 70D-01 (1955).
52. RESr. 2D § 89B (rent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
53. Id. § 89C.
54. Id. § 89D.
55. E.g., UCC §§ 2-205 (firm offers), 2-328 (auction without reserve), 3-408 (negotiable
instrument given as security for antecedent obligation), 2-209 (modifying agreement).
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In comparison with the original Restatement, the provisions on
nominal consideration narrow the categories of binding promises in
one respect and broaden them in another. Illustration 1 to former
Section 84 indicated that a promise to make a gift of land worth $5,000
would be made binding by payment or promise of a nominal $1, but
Illustration 1 to former Section 83 stated that a signed writing reciting
payment of $1 as consideration for a guaranty was not binding if it were
shown that the $1 was neither paid nor expected to be paid. New
Sections 89B and 89C give effect to nominal consideration only if the
promise is in writing and signed by the promisor, recites a purported
consideration, and either is an offer for "an exchange on fair terms
within a reasonable time" or is a "promise to be surety for the per-
formance of a contractual obligation, made to the obligee." But if these
conditions are met, the recital is conclusive: "the giving and recital of
nominal consideration performs a formal function only. The signed
writing has vital significance as a formality, while the ceremonial
manual delivery of a dollar or a peppercorn is an inconsequential
formality."50 The validity of nominal consideration actually delivered
is firmly based on authority in cases of option contracts and guaranties;
as to promises to make gifts, the authorities look the other way. As to
false recitals, the authorities are in direct conflict.57
The limitation of the option contract provision on nominal con-
sideration to an offer for an exchange "on fair terms"5 " has an analogue
in the limitation of the binding effect of modifying agreements without
consideration to "fair and equitable" modifications. " Both of these
situations involve an unusual degree of judicial review of the fairness
of private transactions. Although the overlapping provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code dealing with firm offers and modifications0
are not expressly subject to such limitations, the accompanying com-
ments note that the Code sections dealing with good faith and uncon-
scionable terms 1 should apply to prevent abuse.
Section 90 is even more explicitly limited to the enforcement of what
justice requires. The second Restatement reaffirms the principle that
reliance by a promisee may be a substitute for consideration and
expands the comment and illustrations.62 The principal change is recog-
56. RysT. 2D § 89B, comment c (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
57. See id., Reporter's Note § 89B, at 143-44.
58. Id. § 89B(1)(a).
59. Id. § 89D(1)(a).
60. UCC §§ 2-205, 2-209.
61. UCC §§ 1-203, 2-203.
62. See Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of Doctrine, 98
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nizing as a remedy the possibility of partial enforcement of the promise.
Partly because of this change, the requirement in the original Restate-
ment that the action or forbearance in reliance have "a definite and
substantial character" is deleted; the comment points out that this
requirement has not been enforced in cases of charitable subscriptions
or marriage settlements. In addition, a phrase is added which protects
reliance by beneficiaries. The net effect of the changes is to encourage
the use of and to broaden this category of binding promises.
D. Contracts Under Seal
The principal feature of the treatment of the seal in the second
Restatement is the statutory note describing the "decay of the seal" by
delineating the extent to which the common law on the subject has
been displaced by statute.6 This development demonstrates that the
seal has lost the force it once had in common understanding: the
formality of creating the contract document has been eroded "until it
can be met by a printed form." Meanwhile "literacy has become
almost universal [and] the personal signature is widely used for the
purposes of authentication .. . ,,'4 To some extent the result reduces
freedom of contract: in less than half of the states the seal remains
effective to validate a promise to make a gift; in most of the other
states there is no simple substitute.
Consistently with the "erosion" of the formality of affixing a seal and
the "decay" of legal consequences of the use of a seal, the second Restate-
ment allows more scope than the original for using evidence of extrinsic
circumstances to determine whether an obligor "adopts" the printed
word "seal" following his signature.05 This change is consistent with
the recognition in the original Restatement, carried for%,ard in the
revision, that a sealed instrument may be delivered to the promisee
subject to an unsealed condition(' and that a seal may be treated as
surplusage when the elements of a bargain are present. 7
U. PA. L. R~v. 459 (1950); Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle front Precedents. 50
Mica. L. REv. 639, 873 (1952).
63. Rsr. 2D, Introductory Note and Statutory Note to cl. 4, topic 3, at 189-96 (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1965). See Braucher, The Status of the Seal Today, 9 Pwic. LAw., May, 1963,
at 97.
64. Rr. 2o, Introductory Note to ch. 4, topic 3, at 190 (rent. Draft No. 2. 1965).
65. Id. § 98, illustration 1; cf. Transbel Inv. Co. v. Venetos, 279 N.Y. 207, 18 N.Y2d
129 (1938).
66. REsr. 2D § 103 (rent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
67. Id. § 108; cf. Johnson-Foster Co. v. D'Amore Coast. Co., 314 Mass. 416. 50 N.E.2d
89 (1943).
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II. Multiple Parties
Although disputes which involve more than two parties are inher-
ently complex and difficult, the English law courts made matters worse.
In an action at law, it was said that there could be only two sides, and
it was sometimes thought that only unconditional relief could be
awarded by the court. To some extent the equity courts mitigated the
resulting confusion. But rules developed which were not and perhaps
could not be rationalized in accordance with any intelligible policy.
Rules and results were articulated in terms of the supposed inherent
nature of the rights involved and were adhered to in circumstances
which outraged both common and commercial sense. The modern
history of joint contracts, third party beneficiaries and assignments is
one of piecemeal reform by statute or decision. The legal pattern at
any particular moment was usually a disgrace.
It is not difficult to articulate principles to be followed in dealing
with contractual obligations involving more than two parties. Subject
to any overriding social policy, the parties should have the power to
define their rights and duties, and courts should try to divine and en-
force the common intention. Where the parties have not provided a
term governing the matter in dispute, the contract should be treated
in the usual way if there is one, otherwise in some intelligent and
workable manner consistent with the contractual framework estab-
lished by the parties.68 In litigation either the plaintiff or the defendant
should be allowed to bring in any third party who may be affected by
the decision, or the third party should be permitted to intervene; if
the third party is not available the court should fashion the remedy so
that no unfairness results to him or to the parties before it. Only if
these requirements are impossible to meet should the action fail for
non-joinder. To the extent the authorities permit, the rules stated in
the second Restatement are consistent with these principles.
A. Joint Promisors
The common law was at its worst in cases where two or more
promisors promised the same performance to the same promisee. In
these cases the traditional rule is that the promisors incur only a joint
duty unless an intention is manifested to create several duties or joint
and several duties.0 9
68. Cf. Farnsworth, Disputes of Omission in Contracts, 68 COLU,. L. REv. 860 (1968).
69. REs. 2D § 112 & comment b (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965); see G. WILLAsS, JOINT
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Where a "joint" duty differs from "joint and several" duties, thejoint duty is invariably less advantageous to the promisee, while the
advantage to the promisor does not normally serve any legitimate
interest; joint duties, as distinguished from joint and several
duties, are likely to reflect ignorance or inadvertence on the part
of the promisee.7
The principal disadvantages to the promisee of the traditional joint
duty are five: (1) compulsory joinder of joint obligors; (2) the require-
ment of judgment for or against all joint obligors; (3) discharge of
joint obligors by a judgment against co-obligors; (4) the rule of sur-
vivorship, which bars actions against deceased joint obligors while co-
promisors survive; and (5) discharge of all joint obligors by the release
of some.71 All but the last are avoided if the obligation is "joint and
several."
Reform has been accomplished primarily by statute, but occasional
judicial decisions have adopted more modern rules without statutory
compulsion.72 The statutes have taken two forms: "joint" duties are
made "joint and several," or the particular rules associated with joint
duties are abolished. As a result, in twenty-two states and the District
of Columbia the reform is complete or nearly so;73 in sixteen states
there has been some reform except with respect to the rule on releases;
in the remaining twelve states one or more of the other outworn rules
seems to be retained.
The question involved in determining the appropriate format for
restatement of this legal situation was whether or not the statutory
changes should be stated or referred to in black letter.7 4 The Institute
OBLiGATIONS (1949); Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions. 55 Mitn. L
Rav. 327 (1957).
The revised Restatement provides the following definition:
There is a basic ambiguity in the use of the words "joint" and "several." In one
usage, promissory duties are said to be "joint" if two or more promissors promise the
same performance, "several" if they promise separate performances, even though sim-
ilar. In the same way, promises are sometimes said to create "joint" rights if the
same performance is promised to more than one promisee. "several" rights if eachpromisee is promised a different performance. In the second usage, both "joint" and
"several" refer to rights and duties created by promises of the same performance.
The second usage is more common in judicial and statutory language, and is the
usage followed here.
Rasr. 2o, Introductory Note to ch. 5, at 24041 (Tent. Draft No. 2. 1965).
70. REsr. 2D, Introductory Note to ch. 5, at 258 (Tent. Draft No. 2. 1955).
71. Id. 242.
72. Id., Statutory Note to ch. 5, at 241-50.
73. Id. The Maine statute resulted from the discussion in the American Law Ini-
tute. MWNE REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 11-17 (Supp. 1965).
74. This question was the subject of a good deal of discussion among the reporter
and his advisors, in the Council of the Institute, and at its annual meeting. The original
Restatement simply stated the traditional common-law rules, with very little comment,
although reference was made in the comments to the Negotiable Instruments Law and to
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decided: (1) to state the modern rule in black letter only if it was sup-
ported by respectable judicial authority not based on statute (for
example, the requirement of a joint judgment m and survivorship 0 );
(2) to state the traditional rule in black letter with qualifications sup-
ported by judicial decisions, and give warning in black letter of further
statutory changes (joinder,1 merger by judgment, 8 and the effect of a
release or covenant not to sue"). The rationale for these decisions was
that where the modern rule is statutory, a statement of the traditional
rule provides the background against which the statute is to be read.
In all cases the situation is elaborated in the comments and reporter's
notes. The effect of the changes is to come a great deal closer to pro-
viding rules which require the manifested intention of the parties to be
made fully effective than was done either by the traditional common-
law rules or the original Restatement.
B. Joint Promisees
No comparable need to reform the common-law rules on joint
obligees existed because these rules were far more satisfactory than
those for joint obligors. Possibly in the interest of symmetry, the origi-
nal Restatement provided that co-promisees of the same performance
might have a "joint" right, "several" rights, or "joint and several"
rights.80 But nothing of substance seemed to turn on this terminology
and the second Restatement refers only to "joint" rights.
One difficulty remains. The compulsory joinder of joint promisees
as plaintiffs is workable because one joint obligee may sue in the name
of all.' But there is a corollary: one joint promisee has power to dis-
charge the duty that the promisor owes to all, unless the promisor par-
ticipates in a breach of the promisee's duty to his co-promisees and is
not in the position of a bona fide purchaser.8 2 These rules are appro-
priate for joint promisees who are partners with power to act for each
other; they are likely to be contrary to common understanding where
a receipt signed by all promisees is useful. And Section 3-116 of the
statutes changing the rules on the effect of a judgment for or against co-obllgors, but to
no other statutes. There was general agreement that the second Restatement should
describe the statutory situation more fully.
75. RFST. 2D § 118 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
76. Id. § 125.
77. Id. § 117.
78. Id. § 119.
79. Id. §§ 121, 122.
80. Id. §§ 111, 128.
81. Id. § 129; see Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 Mm0it. L.
REV. 327 (1957).
82. RaSr. 21) §§ 180, 131 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
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Uniform Commercial Code provides that a negotiable instrument pay-
able to the order of two or more persons, not in the alternative, may
be enforced or discharged only by all. In other situations, an explicit
agreement for payment only on two or more signatures would of course
control, and a manifestation of intention which is less than explicit
might well be given effect.83 As a result of the discussion at the 1965
Annual Meeting, the rule that one joint promisee has power to dis-
charge the rights of all will be qualified by the words "unless limited
by agreement."
C. Contract Beneficiaries
The original Restatement contained no definition of "promisee" and
was criticized by Professor Gardner for the omission. He suggested a
definition which would have included people commonly referred to
as beneficiaries rather than promisees: "A promisee is a person to whom
the speaker attributes some power which is asserted by the promise to
exist."84 The second Restatement defines "promisee" as the person to
whom a promise "is addressed" and "beneficiary" as a person, other
than the promisee, whom performance will benefit.85
Decisions in the latter part of the nineteenth century in both England
and the United States overruled or limited earlier precedents recog-
nizing the rights of contract beneficiaries. The overruling decisions did
not rest on any rational considerations of policy but on supposed neces-
sities of doctrine and logic. In England it was said that consideration
for the promise must move from the party who brings the action, a
requirement which denied any remedy to the beneficiary; s this view
was reaffirmed by the House of Lords as recently as 1967.87 In the
United States the principal difficulty was that the beneficiary was not
a party to the contract; there was no "privity of contract." The supposed
"privity" requirement was largely eaten up by exceptions and, with the
help of the original Restatement, American courts have recognized the
rights of contract beneficiaries as such, except in Massachusetts.81
83. But cf. Freedman v. Montague Associates, Inc., 18 Mlisc. 2d 1. 187 N.YS.2d 636.
rev'd mem., 9 App. Div. 2d 936, 195 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1959), motion for leave to appeal de-
nied, 10 App. Div. 2d 637, 197 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1960).84. See Gardner, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Law of Contracts, 46 HAnsv. LRay. 1, 5 (1932); cf. RESTATEENT OF Co.Mars, MAss. ANNos. ch. 6 (1935).85. R sr. 2n § 2 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965).86. Tweddle v. Atkinson, 1 B. & S. 393 (Q. B. 1861); see 4 A. CoRnn, CoN -m-rcs§§ 836-855 (1951).87. Beswick v. Beswick, [19671 3 W.L.R. 932 (H.L.); see Note, 30 MoD. L. Ra,. 637(1967); Note, 83 L.Q. REv. 465 (1967). The holding was deprived of any practical conse-quence in the particular case by a decree of specific performance at the suit of thepromisee's adminstratrix (who also happened to be the beneficiary).88. See L. Furax & R. BRAucna, BAsic Cor,,'Acr L.Aw 462-63 (1964), identifying s ven
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The original Restatement took the view that either a "donee bene-
ficiary" or a "creditor beneficiary" could assert rights on a contract;
other beneficiaries were "incidental" and could not. 0 The terminology
was somewhat artificial: "donee beenficiary" situations included not
only cases where the beneficiary received a gift but also cases where the
promisor sought "to confer on [the beneficiary] a right";0 "creditor
beneficiary" situations included not only cases involving creditors but
also cases where the promisor promised to perform a "supposed or
asserted duty" of the promisee to the beneficiary.0 ' The terminology
had some judicial acceptance, but it carried overtones of obsolete
doctrine. In the interest of simplification and in recognition of the
power of the parties to control the legal consequences of their agree-
ment, the second Restatement substitutes the term "intended benefi-
ciary" for both "donee" and "creditor" beneficiaries. Unless otherwise
agreed, a beneficiary is an "intended beneficiary"
if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is ap-
propriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of
the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or
(b) the promise manifests an intention to give the beneficiary
the benefit of the promised performance.
0 2
This consolidation of beneficiary terminology required reconsidera-
tion of the principal substantive distinction made in the original Re-
statement between "donee" and "creditor" beneficiaries. In the case of
the donee, the duty to the beneficiary could not be released or affected
by a subsequent agreement between promisee and promisor;
0 3 in the
case of the creditor, subsequent discharge or variation was effective
unless the beneficiary brought suit or otherwise relied on the promise
before he knew of the discharge or variation, or unless there was a fraud
on creditors . 4 This distinction was subjected to vigorous attack and
was contrary to the weight of authority 5
exceptions to the Massachusetts rule that "no action can be maintained by the bene-
ficiary of a contract who is not a party thereto."
89. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACrs § 133 (1932).
90. Id. § 133(1)(a).
91. Id. § 133(I)(b).
92. RxsT. 2D § 133 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1968).
93. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 142 (1932).
94. Id. § 143.
95. See Page, The Power of the Contracting Parties to Alter a Contract for Rendering
a Performance to a Third Person, 12 Wis. L. REv. 141 (1937); Note, 57 COLU. L. Rnv.
406 (1957); Annots., 97 A.L.R.2d 1262 (1964), 44 A.L.R.2d 1270 (1955), 148 A.L.R. 359
(1944), 81 A.L.R. 1271 (1932), 53 A.L.R. 178 (1928), 47 A.L.R. 339 (1927), 21 A.L.R. 439
(1922).
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The second Restatement recognizes the power of promisor and
promisee to create a duty which cannot be modified without the con-
sent of the intended beneficiary. If the agreement or promise contains
no such term, however, the original parties retain power to modify
until the beneficiary, before receiving notification of modification,
"materially changes his position in justifiable reliance on the promise
or brings suit on it or manifests assent to it at the request of the
promisor or promisee."'9 6 The provision for manifestation of assent by
the beneficiary follows a leading Alabama case which relied on the
analogy of offer and acceptance; 97 the comment to this provision also
relies on "the probability that the beneficiary will rely in ways difficult
or impossible to prove."9 Suit by the beneficiary is treated as a "suffi-
cient manifestation of assent to preclude discharge of modification,"90
rather than as a material change of position. Acts which constitute a
fraud on creditors are not defined in black letter; instead they are noted
in the comments and are considered invalidating causes.100
D. Assignment
The historic rule of English common law was that a contractual
right could not be assigned. During the seventeenth century the scope
of that rule was narrowed by the reception of the law merchant into the
common law and by the recognition of an assignment as the equivalent
of a power of attorney granted to the assignee to sue in the assignor's
name. Courts of equity protected the assignee in cases of death or
bankruptcy of the assignor or revocation by him. In the eighteenth cen-
tury the common-law courts began to give effect to the equitable rights
of the assignee. In the United States statutes generally require actions
to be brought in the name of the real party in interest, and the assignee
of a contractual right can sue in his own name without regard to the
distinction between law and equity, although it is still sometimes said
that the rights of an assignee are inherently equitable.
These developments were complete before the original Restatement
was written, and the rules stated in it did not need revision to eliminate
medieval residue. But much of the subject has been affected by the
Uniform Commercial Code and by modern statutes on wage assign-
ments, retail installment sales, and government contracts. In addition
96. R1sr. 2D § 142 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1967).
97. Copeland v. Beard, 217 Ala. 216, 115 So. 389 (1928); see REsr. 2o § 142, Reportcrs
Note at 167 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1967).
98. REsT. 2D § 142, comment h (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1967).
99. Id.
100. Id. § 142, comment i; see id., Reporters Note, at 66. See p. 602 supra.
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to reorganization in the interest of clarity and rationalization in ex-
panded comments, the new material on assignment in the second
Restatement consists primarily of an account of modem statutory de-
velopments. Perhaps the most pervasive change is terminological rather
than substantive: the second Restatement uses "assignment" to mean
what the original called "effective assignment"; 101 a manifestation of
intention to assign which is not effective is called an "attempted" or
"purported" assignment. 10 2
Two questions in this area presented some difficulty. First, Section
9-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code renders ineffective a contract
term which prohibits assignment of an account or contract right; ac-
cording to the official UCC comment this provision "states a rule of
law which is widely recognized in the cases." The reporter for the
second Restatement was unable to find such recognition; and Professor
Gilmore, the principal draftsman of Article 9, has said, "No pre-Code
case has been found ... in which it has been held squarely in an action
between assignee and obligor that the clause was ineffective."' 0 3 The
second Restatement continues to recognize the possibility that assign-
ment may be validly prohibited by contract. 10 4 But it limits the effect
of such a contract term by construing it narrowly "unless a different
intention is manifested."'105 Of course, the Restatement rule is displaced
by the Code in cases to which Section 9-318 of the Code applies.
Second, the original Restatement set forth the rule, now codified for
sale of goods by Section 2-210 of the Uniform Commercial Code, that
"unless the language or the circumstances ... indicate the contrary, an
assignment of "the contract" or an assignment in similar general terms
is also a delegation of performance of the assignor's duties, and that
acceptance of the assignment by the assignee constitutes a promise by
him to perform the assignor's duties. 0 6 That rule was rejected by the
New York Court of Appeals in 1928 as a "proposed change" and "a
complete reversal of our present rule of interpretation as to the
probable intention of the parties."'07 This view was announced in a case
involving assignment of a purchaser's rights under a contract to sell
101. REsT. 2D, Reporter's Note § 149, at 171 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1967).
102. Id. § 149, comment a.
103. G. GiLmoRE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 7.9, at 228 (1965).
See UCC § 2-210; cf. RESTATEMfENT OF PROPERTY §§ 404-417 (restraints on alicnation)
(1936).
104. R.Esr. 2D § 149(2)(c) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1967), formerly RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRAars § 151 (1932).
105. REsr. 2D § 154 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1967), formerly RESTATEMENT OF CoNltACrs
§ 176 (1932).
106. UCo § 2-210(4); Cf. RESTATEMENT OF CONTracTS § 164 (1932).
107. Langel v. Betz, 250 N.Y. 159, 163, 164 N.E. 890, 892 (1928).
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land, and it seems to be supported by the great weight of authority in
such cases;108 the New York court apparently requires an express as-
sumption of duties regardless of the type of contract."* The reporter
and advisers believed the formulation in the original Restatement to be
sound in principle, but in deference to the weight of authority they
submitted a statement of a contrary rule for land contracts. The council
directed that a caveat on the point be submitted as an alternative, and
the Institute by a close vote adopted the caveat: "The Institute ex-
presses no opinion as to whether the rule stated in Subsection (2) applies
to an assignment by a purchaser of his rights under a contract for the
sale of land.""n0 The comment explains the caveat as resulting from
analogizing the purchaser's assignment of his rights under a land con-
tract to "sale of land subject to a mortgage" and from "doctrinal diffi-
culties in the recognition of rights of assignees and beneficiaries [which]
... have .. been overcome .... [b]ut... the shift in doctrine has not
yet produced any definite change in the body of decisions...
III. Conclusion
The effort to make the Restatement of Contracts more useful has
required a very considerable expenditure of energy on the part of the
Institute. In the course of the work there have been occasional expres-
sions of skepticism as to the utility of the effort. One distinguished
member of the Institute asked the reporter whether the material on
consideration could not simply be omitted: he had not found that the
subject arose very much. Of course he had not been exposed to a repre-
sentative sample of modern cases; but even if he were right as to the
incidence of litigation, there would be reason to try to formulate in
rational terms the grounds on which contracts are enforced in modem
American law.
The effort to restate the law of contracts in modem terms highlights
the resilience of private autonomy in an era of expanding government
activity. As restraints imposed on the private sector in the name of
good faith and fair dealing become more candid, they seem also to
108. See 3 S. WILVUSroN, CoNAcrs § 418A (3d ed. Jaeger 1960). But cf. Bank of
America Nat'l T. & S. Ass'n v. McLaughlin, 152 Cal. App. 2d 911, 313 P.2d 220 (1957);
Hodges v. Campbell, 212 Ore. 428, 316 P.2d 312 (1957); Radley v. Smith, 6 Utah 2d 314.
313 P.2d 465 (1957).
109. Sillman v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 395, 144 N.E.2d 387(1957).
110. Rasr. 21 § 160 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1967).
111. Id. § 160, comment c.
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become more cautious, more restrained. Freedom of contract, refined
and redefined in response to social change, has power as it always had.
In recording the response of contract law to the needs of a developing
social order, the Restatement is incorporating concepts documented
for us by Professor Corbin over a lifetime.
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